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I. INTRODUCTION
“[The] easy accessibility of weapons, especially in the developing
world, and the ineffective efforts to control [their] trade have contributed
significantly to the devastating violence we see in the world today.” 1
* LL.M. with highest honors, International & Comparative Law, The George Washington
University Law School; J.D. Cum Laude, University of Maryland Carey School of Law;
M.A., Villanova University; B.A., University of St. Thomas. The author would like to
thank his lovely wife, Kristina Hon, for her support, guidance, and invaluable insight.
The views expressed in this article belong solely to the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of any other organization.
1. Jonathan Grant, “Merchant of Death”: The International Traffic in Arms, ORIGINS
CURRENT
EVENTS
IN
HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES
(Dec.
2012),
http://origins.osu.edu/article/merchants-death-international-traffic-arms.
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The strong correlation between extreme violence and the availability
of arms is one that States have long recognized and have sought to
mitigate through regulation of the arms trade since at least as far back as
the Roman Empire, if not further. 2
In the early 20th century, the international community recognized that
the private manufacture and trade of arms was a significant factor leading
to the devastation of World War I and attempted to regulate the private
arms trade through the Treaty of Versailles. 3 As a result, “most armsproducing States adopted national controls over arms exports,
nationalized their arms industry[,] and instituted government-togovernment sales as a norm.” 4 Unfortunately, in spite of the
acknowledgment that the arms trade exacerbates conflicts, attempts to
regulate the transfer of arms have only resulted in “a patchwork of
regional instruments.” 5
Even though regulated, the manufacture and sale of arms worldwide
is a booming business. 6 Since 2011, the United States (U.S.) has held the
position of top arms exporter with a 33% share of the global arms trade,
followed by Russia in distant second with 25%. 7 Illustrating the rise in
arms exports and the U.S.’ role as the top arms exporter, the
Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a report in 2012 finding
2. Keith Krause & Mary K. MacDonald, Regulating Arms Sales Through World War
II, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT 707, 708 (Richard
Dean Burns ed., 1993).
3. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, art.
8, ¶5, June 28, 1919 [hereinafter Treaty of Peace].
4. Maya Brehm, Conventional Arms Transfers in Light of Humanitarian and
Human Rights Law (Feb. 2005) (unpublished LL.M Thesis, University Centre for
International
Humanitarian
Law)
(on
file
with
PIR
Center
http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/11/13639336240.pdf).
5. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty from a
Humanitarian Perspective 11, ICRC Doc. 4252/002 (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter Understanding
the Arms Trade Treaty], https://shop.icrc.org/understanding-the-arms-trade-treatyfrom-a-humanitarian-perspective-2820.html.
6. See International Arms Transfers, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST.,
https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/arms-transfers-andmilitary-spending/international-arms-transfers (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
7. Top 10 Arms Exporters by Country, 2011–15, Per cent of Global Share, STOCKHOLM
INT’L
PEACE
RES.
INST.
(2016),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/styles/body_embedded/public/web_figure
_1_1.png?itok=4TApBBde (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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that of the $85.3 billion in arms transfer agreements concluded
worldwide in 2011, arms transfer agreements by the United States totaled
“$66.3 billion (77.7% of all such agreements).” 8 The report also found
that the overall dollar value of the transfer agreements saw “an
extraordinary increase from . . . 2010,” with the rise in arms transfers
being attributed to purchases by the Persian Gulf states. 9 In particular,
the report found that the “U.S. arms agreements with Saudi Arabia . . .
represent, by far, the largest share of U.S. agreements with the world or
the developing world in 2011.” 10
In 2015, CRS issued another report on conventional arms transfers to
developing nations citing “potentially significant updates to and
revisions” of arms transfer trends in the years following the Cold War
and the Persian Gulf War, finding that “today th[e principal motivation
for arms sales] may be based as much, if not more, on economic
considerations as those of foreign or national security policy.” 11 The
report also found that although the global arms trade had slowed, the
“United States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making
agreements valued at $36.2 billion (50.4% of all such agreements),”
which was an increase of about $10 billion from 2013. 12 Notably, “[t]he
U.S. market share increased greatly as well, from roughly 38% in 2013 to
50% in 2014 . . . [with] larger valued arms transfer agreements . . .
includ[ing] multiple agreements with Saudi Arabia.” 13
The following year, CRS issued an additional report analyzing
conventional arms transfers to developing nations from 2008 to 2015,
finding that the United States “ranked first in value of all arms deliveries
worldwide [in 2015] . . . [for] the eighth year in a row.” 14 As with the two
previous reports, the U.S. conventional arms transfer agreements to
8. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT & PAUL K. KERR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42678,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2004–2011 3 (2012).
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id.
11. CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44320,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2007–2014 1–2
(2015).
12. Id. at 3.
13. Id. at 4, 7.
14. CATHERINE A. THEOHARY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44716,
CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS TO DEVELOPING NATIONS, 2008–2015 3 (2016).
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developing countries were “valued at $40.2 billion (50.29% of all such
agreements),” demonstrating an increase of $16 billion from 2014. 15
While this CRS report stated that “new arms sales have become more
difficult to conclude in the face of economic factors” and limited growth
in the overall international arms market, countries in the Near East and
Asia continued to make major arms purchases from the United States. 16
As a result of these major purchases—the largest ones made by Saudi
Arabia and Qatar—“the U.S. market share of the value of all [arms
transfer agreements with developing nations increased to] 40.99% in
2015.” 17
Taken all together, the United States delivered $164.3 billion in
conventional weapons, equipment, and training to 170 countries from
2002 to 2014. 18 However, unlike in the past, an international treaty now
exists to regulate the international trade of conventional arms worldwide,
supplanting the existing regional patchwork of agreements. On
December 24, 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force,
binding parties to the agreement to provide better national regulations
on the sale and transfer of arms. 19 Although the United States did not
ratify the ATT, 20 then-Secretary of State John Kerry signed the treaty on
September 25, 2013. 21 The United States remained a signatory until July
18, 2019, when it submitted a letter to the United Nations (U.N.)
formally stating it would no longer seek to ratify the ATT and will no
longer be bound by the legal obligations of its signature. 22 While such a
15. Id.
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Sec.
Assistance
Monitor,
ARMS
SALES
DASHBOARD,
https://securityassistance.org/content/arms-sales-dashboard. (last visited Sept. 3,
2019).
19. Arms Trade Treaty, Sept. 25, 2013, 3012 U.N.T.S. 52373 [hereinafter ATT]. See
Michelle Nichols, U.N. Says Arms Trade Treaty to Enter into Force on December 24, REUTERS
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-assembly-arms-treatyidUSKCN0HK1WP20140925.
20. Ramsey Cox, Senate Votes 53–46 to Stop U.S. from Joining U.N. Arms Trade Treaty,
THE HILL (Mar. 23, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/290001senate-votes-to-stop-us-from-joining-un-arms-treaty.
21. See John Kerry, Sec’y of State, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Arms Trade
Treaty Signing Ceremony (Sept. 25, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/214717.htm).
22. UNITED NATIONS, STATUS OF MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE
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step eliminates the legal obligations of the United States moving forward,
such an action does not proactively absolve the United States of its duty
to have refrained, in good faith, from acts that would have defeated the
object and purpose of the treaty while it was a signatory. 23 Therefore,
regardless of the withdrawal of its signature, the U.S.’ delivery of $116.43
billion in conventional weapons, equipment, and training to 187
countries worldwide since 2014 must not have undermined the object
and purpose of the ATT. 24
To ensure compliance with its legal obligations as a signatory to the
ATT from 2014 to 2019, the United States was required to properly
assess the impacts of its arms transfers. The most significant such
example during that time period is the $15.9 billion in weapons that the
United States delivered to Saudi Arabia, a country mired in the ongoing
conflict in Yemen. 25 The war in Yemen has killed and injured an
estimated 17,062 civilians between March 26, 2015 and August 9, 2018,
with a “majority of [those] casualties . . . a result of airstrikes carried out
by the Saudi-led Coalition.” 26 A great deal of international and domestic
criticism has been leveled on the tactics and indiscriminate attacks used
by Saudi Arabia and in particular, on the U.S.’ current and proposed arms
sales to Saudi Arabia that enable those attacks. 27
SECRETARY-GENERAL,
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI8&chapter=26&clang=_en#3 (last visited Oct. 18, 2019).
23. See Paul Gragl & Malgosia Fitzmaurice, The Legal Character of Article 18 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 68 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 699, 699-705 (July 2019);
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT].
24. See Sec. Assistance Monitor, supra note 18.
25. Id.
26. Spokesperson, U.N. Off. of the High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Press briefing
notes on Yemen civilian casualties (Aug. 10, 2018) [hereinafter Briefing notes on
Yemen],
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2343
9&LangID=E.
27. Oxfam, $1.15 billion arms sale threatens countless lives in war–torn Yemen (Sept. 6,
2016),
https://www.oxfamamerica.org/explore/stories/115-billion-arms-salethreatens-countless-lives-in-war-torn-yemen/; Jeff Abramson, Trump Touts Saudi Arms
Sales, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (Apr. 2018) [hereinafter Abramson, Trump Touts Saudi
Arms Sales], https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-04/news/trump-touts-saudiarms-sales; Helene Cooper, State Dept. Approves $670 Million Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia,
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While scholars have written about the humanitarian impact of
providing weapons to Saudi Arabia and the legality under U.S. domestic
law, 28 there has been no examination of whether the U.S. arms transfers
undermine the object and purpose of the ATT in violation of customary
international law. 29 As such, the first section of this paper will examine
the obligations of signatories to treaties as set forth by Article 18(a) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and identify the
current international customary law interpretation as understood by the
United States. The second section will identify the object and purpose
of the ATT and determine the threshold for violating it. The third
section will look at Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the armed conflict in
Yemen and the arms transfers by the United States from 2014 to 2019 as
a case study, and will include an analysis of the U.S. response to the
attacks carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. The final section will
provide a conclusion as to whether the arms transfers by the United
States effectively defeated the object and purpose of the ATT and what
this means for future arms deals with countries involved in armed
conflicts.

II. THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES
With the “growing importance of treaties . . . [it is] increasingly evident
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/usarms-sales-saudi-arabia-.html; US Announces $1 Billion in Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia, VOA
NEWS (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/usa/us-announces-1-billion-armssales-saudi-arabia; Rebecca Kheel, State Department Clears $1.3B Artillery Sale to Saudi
Arabia, THE HILL (Apr. 5, 2018), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/381867-statedepartment-clears-13b-artillery-sale-to-saudi-arabia.
28. See generally Michael Newton, An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen, (Vanderbilt Univ. L.
Research, Working Paper No. 17˗26, 2017); Jeff Abramson, Opponents Challenge Saudi
Arms Sale, ARMS CONTROL TODAY (July 2017) [hereinafter Abramson, Opponents
Challenge
Saudi
Arms
Sale],
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/201707/news/opponents-challenge-saudi-arms-sale; Oona Hathaway et al., The Legality of
U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia for Use in Yemen, JUSTSECURITY (Mar. 7, 2018)
[hereinafter
Hathaway
et
al.,
Legality
of
U.S.
Arms
Sales],
https://www.justsecurity.org/53449/u-s-arms-sales-saudi-arabia-yemen/;
Oona
Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?, 10 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 20-21
(2019) [hereinafter Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?].
29. See ATT art. 1, supra note 19.
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[that there is a] need for clear, well-defined and readily ascertainable rules
of international law applicable to treaties.” 30 This was the statement
made by President Nixon in 1971 in a message urging the U.S. Senate to
provide advice and consent for the ratification of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which sought to codify those rules of
international law applicable to treaties. 31 However, even with the urging
of the President, the Senate decided against providing its advice and
consent, thereby leaving the VCLT signed but unratified by the United
States. 32
Although only a signatory, the current U.S. position is that “many of
the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [are
considered to be] customary international law.” 33 This position was first
enumerated by then-Secretary of State William Rogers in 1971 when he
stated that while “not yet in force, the Convention is already generally
recognized as the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice.” 34
Additionally, the U.S. position on the legal posture of the VCLT directly
tracks with the international consensus that “deem[s] at least certain
provisions of the Vienna Convention reflective of customary
international law, thereby binding on all states.” 35 Therefore, while not
a State Party to the VCLT, the United States—via affirmative statement
and international consensus—is legally bound by those treaty provisions
determined to be customary international law. 36
30. Richard Nixon, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties Transmitted to the Senate, in
65 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 684 (1971).
31. I. M. Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 47,
48–49 (1970) (“It regulates in Part II the conclusion and entry into force of treaties
(including reservations), in Part III, the observance, application and interpretation of
treaties, in Part IV, the amendment and modification of treaties, in controversial Part
V, the invalidity, termination and suspension of operation of treaties, Part VI, certain
miscellaneous points, and in Part VII, the functions of depositories and requirements
as to notifications, corrections and registrations.”).
32. See Is the United States a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF STATE], https://20092017.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
33. Id.
34. Nixon, supra note 30, at 685.
35. Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligation of Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 71, 75
(1991).
36. See Charme, supra note 35, at 75.
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A. ARTICLE 18
Article 18 of the VCLT is the codification of “a signatory’s interim
obligation” to refrain from attempts to defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty. 37 The text of Article 18 reads:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty
subject ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed. 38

Although there is some contention regarding the nature of Article 18,
it is generally accepted that “[b]oth conventional law and case law . . .
establish the propriety of portraying the interim obligation to refrain
from defeating the object and purpose of a treaty as customary law.” 39
Further supporting the assertion that Article 18 is customary
international law is the statement by the International Law Commission
(ILC) in its 1966 commentary affirming that an “obligation of good faith
to refrain from acts calculated to frustrate the object of a treaty attaches
to a State which has signed a treaty that is subject to ratification.” 40 Taken
together, “provisions in treaties, judicial and arbitral decisions,
diplomatic statements, and the conduct of the International Law
Commission . . . compel, in the aggregate, the conclusion that article 18
37. VCLT art. 18, supra note 23.
38. VCLT art. 18, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
39. See David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a Treaty:
Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 565, 569–70 (2010); Curtis A.
Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J.
311, 314 (2007); Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into
Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 283, 296 (2001); Isabelle
Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The “Object and Purpose” of a Treaty: An Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN
REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 311, 311–12 (1998); Charme, supra note 35, at 77–78.
40. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its eighteenth session, [1966] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 169, 202, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.l [hereinafter
Report of International Law Commission].
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constituted the codification of the interim obligation . . . [and] indicate as
well that this norm continues as a rule of customary international law.” 41
Therefore, Article 18 of the VCLT is binding on the United States in
relation to every treaty it has signed but not ratified, including the ATT.
Yet determining the actual object and purpose of a particular treaty
has created much confusion, spurred scholarship, and given rise to
extensive international jurisprudence on the issue. 42 This is despite the
fact that “interim obligations [are] recognized in virtually all systems of
law, so that the principles stated in . . . [Article 18] w[ere] no[t an]
innovation.” 43
The phrase “object and purpose” can most clearly be defined as “an
inherently abstract concept that refers broadly to a treaty’s goals.” 44 The
importance of the interim obligation enumerated by Article 18 has been
described as an attempt “to reconcile two competing concerns:” first, the
ability of a State to review the treaty obligations under domestic
procedures and second, a worry over the reliance on other States to act
in accordance with the treaty. 45 Scholars have suggested a variety of
methods for interpreting a treaty’s object and purpose that includes, for
example, the essential elements test, 46 the impossible performance test, 47
the bad faith and manifest intent tests, 48 and the status quo/facilitation
test. 49 Each of these methods rests on two basic assumptions: that the
object and purpose of a treaty is not always clear and that the negative
effect of undermining a treaty’s object and purpose will only manifest
after the signatory State has ratified the treaty. 50 The ultimate goal behind
these methods of interpretation seems to be to ensure that a signatory
State does not gain an unfair advantage in relation to the regulations or

41. Charme, supra note 35, at 85.
42. See generally Jonas & Saunders, supra note 39.
43. Summary records of the first part of the seventeenth session, [1965] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n
87, 92 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1965.
44. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 39, at 596–608.
45. Id. at 596.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 598.
48. Id. at 601-03.
49. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 39, at 603–04.
50. See id. at 596–604.
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obligations prior to ratification. 51
However, the two foundational assumptions and ultimate goal of the
methods overlook the potential for a treaty to resolve the ambiguity and
confusion itself by clearly stating its intended object and purpose. To
avoid the possibility that a treaty’s intended object and purpose is
obfuscated by the self-serving interpretation of States, some modern
treaties have included articles that more directly state the object and
purpose of the treaty. 52 This potential evolution in treaty drafting is best
highlighted by the ATT, which clearly states its object and purpose. 53
Therefore, the above-mentioned methods are not applicable to the issue
of determining the scope of the object and purpose of the ATT in order
to ascertain whether the United States potentially defeated it. 54

III.

THE ARMS TRADE TREATY

The Arms Trade Treaty “is the first legally-binding instrument ever
negotiated in the United Nations to establish common standards for the
international transfer of conventional weapons.” 55 In 2006, the “fact that
the international trade in bananas was more tightly regulated under
international law than conventional arms” drew the attention of the
international community and put in motion an effort to create
international regulations for the sale and transfer of conventional arms. 56
Prompted by a strong civil society campaign, the nations of Argentina,
Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, Kenya, and the United Kingdom
sponsored “the first United Nations General Assembly resolution on an
arms trade treaty in 2006.” 57 However, it was not until April 2, 2013 that
the U.N. General Assembly voted “by overwhelming majority” 58 to
51. Id. at 595-97.
52. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 1, Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
53. ATT art. 1, supra note 19.
54. Id.
55. Permanent Rep. of Austl. to the U.N. in Geneva & Ambassador for
Disarmament, Arms Trade Treaty 1 (2014) [hereinafter Ambassador for Disarmament],
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/att/att_e.pdf.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Id.
58. U.N. Off. for Disarmament Aff., ATT Implementation Toolkit | Module 1 | Why
Join the Arms Trade Treaty? 2 [hereinafter ATT Implementation Toolkit], https://unoda-
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adopt the ATT, a treaty heralded as “a historic achievement for the
United Nations and multilateralism.” 59
On December 24, 2014, the ATT entered into force and it currently
has 104 State Parties and an additional twenty-six signatory States. 60 The
motivation behind the ATT is to stop the “[u]nregulated and
irresponsible arms transfers [that] intensify and prolong conflict, lead to
regional instability, facilitate human rights abuses . . . and hinder social
and economic development.” 61 To accomplish this goal, State Parties are
required to adopt national legislation that establishes controls and
oversight of arms exports, as well as regulations that better manage the
State’s arms stockpiles. 62 In particular, the scope of the ATT “includes
all transfers, including the sale, loan, gift, or lease” of weapons, which
include battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large-caliber artillery
systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and
missile launchers, and small arms and light weapons. 63 The ATT seeks
to establish “controls over the international import, export and transfer of
conventional arms . . . [because] it is easier for [these] weapons to be
diverted from the legal trade into the illegal market, and into the hands
of terrorists, drug traffickers and criminal cartels.” 64
In providing the rationale for the necessity of the ATT, the U.N.
Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) stated that “global trade in
nearly all categories of manufactured goods . . . is regulated by rules
which bind exporters and importers to commonly agreed conduct . . .
[and t]he global trade in conventional weapons should be no

web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/2015-08-21Toolkit-Module-1.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
59. Ambassador for Disarmament, supra note 55, at 2.
60. U.N. Off. for Disarmament Aff., ATT Status of ratifications and accessions 1
[hereinafter ATT Status of ratifications and accessions], https://s3.amazonaws.com/unodaweb/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/ATT-status-of-ratifications-and-accessionsAugust-2019.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2019).
61. ATT Implementation Toolkit, supra note 58, at 2.
62. Id.
63. Knut Doermann & Louise Arimatsu, Adoption of a Global Arms Trade Treaty:
Challenges Ahead, CHATHAM HOUSE 4 (Apr. 16, 2013) (emphasis added).
64. Fact Sheets: Arms Trade Treaty Myths and Facts, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 1 (2012)
[hereinafter
MYTHS
AND
FACTS],
https://20092017.state.gov/documents/organization/194218.pdf.
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exception.” 65 It is important to note that UNODA also states that
“[e]ach sovereign State determines its own laws and regulations for the
manufacture, sale and possession of firearms by its citizens” and that the
ATT’s goal is not “to ban any weapon category from being traded,
but . . . to set regulations on the global, cross border trade in
conventional weapons.” 66 By affirmative statement in the text itself, the
ATT’s stated goal is to create international guidelines that will regulate
the international arms trade to prevent diversion but still allow countries
to manufacture, transfer, and acquire conventional arms. 67
From the U.S. perspective, the ATT is meant to “establish a common
international standard for the national regulation of the international
trade in conventional arms.” 68 The benefits of the ATT have been
identified as being able to improve “both U.S. national security and
global security by reducing the risk that international transfers of
conventional arms will be used to carry out the world’s worst crimes,
including genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.” 69
Additionally, the United States recognizes that the ATT allows for “the
sovereign right of any State to regulate conventional arms within its own
territory” and that “legitimate political, security, economic, and
commercial purposes of the international trade in conventional arms”
exist. 70 When the U.S. interpretation is compared to UNODA’s public
statements regarding the objectives of the ATT, little if any difference
exists between the U.S. understanding and the stated intent of the treaty.
71

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See ATT art. 1, supra note 19
68. Press Release, Office of the Spokesperson, U.S. Dep’t of State, The Arms Trade
Treaty
1
(Sept.
25,
2013),
https://20092017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214706.htm.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. While recent statements made by President Trump contradict this assertion,
and recognizing that foreign policy is the provenance of the Executive, there have been
no affirmative statements revoking the previous U.S. understanding as to the
implications of the ATT to support a conclusion that a shift has occurred. See OFFICE
OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., DEF. TECH. SEC. ADMIN., ARMS TRANSFER POLICIES &
TREATIES 1, https://www.dtsa.mil/SitePages/promoting-engagement/arms-transferpolicies-and-treaties.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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A. ARTICLE 1
Article 1 is a unique aspect of the ATT and is exceptionally important
to the understanding of the treaty’s object and purpose, because unlike
most other treaties, Article 1 clearly states the object and purpose. 72 The
text of Article 1 reads as follows:
The object of this Treaty is to:
Establish the highest possible common international standards for
regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade of
conventional arms;
Prevent and eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent
their diversion;
[F]or the purpose of:
Contributing to international and regional peace, security and stability;
Reducing human suffering;
Promoting cooperation, transparency and responsible action by States
Parties in the international trade in conventional arms, thereby building
confidence among States Parties. 73

The existence of Article 1 thereby avoids the necessity of analyzing
much of the scholarship relating to how the object and purpose of a
treaty should be identified. Nevertheless, a question remains regarding
whether the text of Article 1 establishes a standard sufficient to
determine whether a specific State action is an attempt to defeat the
object and purpose of the ATT.

B. OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE ATT
An examination of Article 1 reveals that the ATT has at least two
separate but interconnected object-and-purposes. The first can be
described as regulation and cooperation, which seeks to have States
72. ATT art. 1, supra note 19.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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create “the highest possible common international standards for
regulation . . . for the purpose of . . . [p]romoting cooperation,
transparency and responsible action by States Parties.” 74 The second can
be identified as peace and stability, which seeks to “[p]revent and
eradicate the illicit trade in conventional arms and prevent their
diversion . . . for the purpose of contributing to international and
regional peace, security and stability . . . [and] reducing human
suffering.” 75 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
suggested that at least one of the identifiable purposes of the ATT “is to
reduce human suffering by establishing the highest possible common
international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the
international trade in conventional arms.” 76 However, this restatement
is somewhat lacking because it only considers the purpose in light of
State Party obligations and does not consider that signatories to the ATT
are only bound by an interim obligation. Since signatories are not yet
legally bound by the treaty articles, they have no duty to create the
necessary national regulations on international conventional arms
transfers.
Of the two object-and-purposes found in the text of the ATT, only
peace and stability enumerates obligations that signatories can be
expected to uphold. Put more plainly, a signatory to the ATT cannot
have a positive duty—the development of national standards to regulate
the international trade of conventional arms—attach as part of its interim
obligation. 77 Rather, the only obligation placed on signatory States is a
negative one to refrain from actions that would undermine the object
and purpose of the treaty. 78 The regulation and cooperation object-andpurpose in the ATT seems to be more of a practical goal of the treaty for
those countries that have become State Parties because it requires States
to take affirmative actions. The establishment of such a positive duty on
a signatory State would significantly blur the line—or possibly eliminate
74. Id.
75. ATT art. 1, supra note 19.
76. See DOERMANN & ARIMATSU, supra note 63, at 4.
77. See VCLT arts. 18, 19(c), supra note 23; see also Jonas & Saunders, supra note 23,
at 573 (“Notably, both Articles 18 and 19(c) [of the Vienna Convention] create an object
and purpose obligation in negative terms.”).
78. See VCLT arts. 18, 19(c), supra note 23; see also Jonas & Saunders, supra note 23,
at 572.
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the distinction—between signature and ratification.
Therefore, in light of the fact that the signing of a treaty can only
impose a negative duty and not a positive one, the author suggests that
the actual object and purpose of the ATT is to ensure “international and
regional peace, security and stability . . . [by] reducing human suffering,”
through the “[r]especting and ensuring [of] respect for international
humanitarian law.” 79 This object and purpose takes language from both
Article 1 and the Preamble of the ATT, which is reflective of the standard
practice of examining “[the treaty’s] title and preamble as well as the
context of the negotiations” in order to identify its object and purpose. 80
The rationale for the inclusion of the preambular language referencing
international humanitarian law (IHL) 81 is to better understand the phrase
‘human suffering’ in the full context of the treaty as is required by the
VCLT. 82
It is also important to note that the concern over violations of IHL—
as a result of the proliferation of weapons and the ease with which groups
likely to commit such violations could obtain those weapons—was one
of the primary catalysts in the creation of the ATT. 83 Also illustrating
the consideration of IHL in the drafting of the ATT is the existence of
Article 7, which “recognize[s] that a potential export could still cause
serious humanitarian consequences” and requires State Parties to “refuse
the export of arms based on a risk assessment” if it determined the
weapons would likely be used to violate IHL. 84 Ultimately, the inclusion
79. ATT pmbl., art. 1, supra note 19.
80. STUART CASEY-MASLEN ET AL., GENEVA ACAD. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.
& HUM. RTS., ACADEMY BRIEFING NO. 3: THE ARMS TRADE TREATY (2013) 17 (2013)
[hereinafter BRIEFING NO. 3].
81. See generally Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, What is International Humanitarian Law?
1
(Dec.
2004),
https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/4541/what-is-ihlfactsheet.pdf (“International humanitarian law is a set of rules that seeks, for
humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are
not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods
of warfare. International humanitarian law is also known as the law of war or the law
of armed conflict.”).
82. See VCLT art. 31(1), supra note 23 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
83. See Ambassador for Disarmament, supra note 58, at 1.
84. Id. at 5 (referencing Article 7 of the ATT).
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of the reference to IHL from the Preamble is in accordance with the
typical manner by which the object and purpose of a treaty is determined
and tracks directly with the underlying purpose of the treaty. Taken
together, Article 1 and the language of the Preamble establish an object
and purpose as well as a sufficiently clear standard by which to assess
whether the action of a signatory State is attempting to defeat it. 85

C. DEFEATING THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE THRESHOLD
While scholars agree that Article 18 of the VCLT creates an interim
obligation for signatory States, “it remains unclear how to determine
whether the interim obligation is being violated.” 86 This is because the
object and purpose of a treaty is often hard to identify through the
interpretation of the title, preamble, and context of negotiations. 87
However, Article 1 of the ATT makes that task easier as it “sets out in
more general terms the goals and objectives of the treaty.” 88 While such
goals and objectives may seem vague, “[i]t is important to note that . . .
[a State’s] arms transfer does not occur in a legal vacuum.” 89 To defeat
the object and purpose of the ATT, a State must take an action that
would undermine international and regional peace, security, and stability
while also causing human suffering through violations of IHL.
To more explicitly define the threshold for violating the object and
purpose of the ATT, it is necessary to rely on the preambular language
of “respecting and ensuring respect,” 90 which refers to the principles of
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and humanity codified in the
Geneva Conventions of 1949. 91 The obligation established by Common
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, which the ATT Preamble
references, requires High Contracting Parties to ensure that they
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See ATT pmbl., arts. 1, 7, supra note 19.
Klabbers, supra note 39, at 283.
See Jonas & Saunders, supra note 39, at 566.
BRIEFING NO. 3, supra note 80, at 17.
Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 5, at 12.
ATT pmbl., supra note 19.
See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Article 1: Respect for the Convention, in
COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES
IN THE FIELD, 2D ED., ¶ 118 (Mar. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Respect for the Convention],
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary.
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“themselves, their armed forces, other persons and groups acting on their
behalf, and their populations as a whole” comply with IHL. 92
Additionally, the ICRC has stated that customary international law has
formed requiring High Contracting Parties “not only [to] apply the
provisions [of the Geneva Conventions to] themselves, but also do
everything reasonably in their power to ensure that the provisions are
respected universally.” 93 Therefore, for State action to breach the
threshold for violating the object and purpose of the ATT, “there has to
be a clear risk that the arms [transferred] will be used to commit serious
violations of [international humanitarian] law.” 94 This commitment by
States to ensure their arms transfers will not be used to violate IHL is a
fairly common standard throughout the regional arms control
agreements and is enumerated in Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT and as such
is an appropriate threshold for determining if a State action defeats the
object and purpose of the ATT. 95
Since the goal of the use of military force by a State is to subdue the
opposing force through death and destruction, attacks on enemy
combatants and legitimate military targets cannot be considered contrary
to the object and purpose of the ATT because they are actions permitted
by IHL. 96 However, an attack directed against civilians who are not
directly participating in hostilities, or against civilian infrastructure, is a
violation of IHL and thus contrary to the object and purpose of the
ATT. 97 Consequently, if an attack against civilians is found to have been
facilitated by an arms transfer from another State—the attack was
conducted using a weapon transferred or sold by State A to the offending
State B—then that transfer of arms is considered an action defeating the
92. Id.
93. Id. ¶ 119.
94. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Arms Transfer Decisions Applying International
Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law Criteria: A Practical Guide, ICRC
Doc.
0916/002,
5
(Aug.
2016)
[hereinafter
Practical
Guide],
https://shop.icrc.org/decisions-en-matiere-de-transferts-d-039-armes-applicationdes-criteres-fondes-sur-le-droit-international-humanitaire-2814.html.
95. See Practical Guide, supra note 94, at 5–6.
96. See generally Jean–Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald–Beck, Customary
International Humanitarian Law Volume I: Rules, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 11–14
(2009),
https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/customary-internationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf.
97. See id. at 11.
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object and purpose of the ATT. Accordingly, when conventional arms
are transferred to a country engaged in an armed conflict, the transferring
State must ensure that the “arms transfer decision . . . include[s] a
consideration of whether the recipient is likely to respect [international
humanitarian] law.” 98 In making this determination, the transferring
State should focus on whether there are “past trends [of violations] . . .
[and/or] recent violations [that] would . . . indicate a clear risk” exists. 99
The above-stated obligation to ensure that an arms transfer decision
took into consideration the potential for IHL violations is one that States
have supported during three International Conferences of the Red Cross
and Crescent that took place between 2003 and 2011. 100 This obligation
has also been analogized to that of the principle of non-refoulement. 101
The analogy has been stated as:
If a government may not return or expel a person to a state in which his or
her life or freedom will be at risk on grounds of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a social group or political opinion, nor may it sanction the
transfer of arms to a country in which the risk arises of serious violation of . . .
[international] humanitarian law. 102

Along these lines, the ICRC has suggested that “States that have
signed the ATT must immediately review their arms transfer policies so
as to avoid any transfers that would undermine the Treaty’s object and
purpose.” 103 This assertion that a signatory State review its arms transfer
policies should not be confused with the negative duty of the interim
obligation. 104 Instead, the review proposed by the ICRC should be seen
98. BRIEFING NO. 3, supra note 80, at 15; Practical Guide, supra note 94, at 4.
99. Practical Guide, supra note 94, at 11.
100. BRIEFING NO. 3, supra note 80, at 15.
101. See Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle
of Non–Refoulement: Opinion, U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES 87, 97 (June 30, 2001),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/419c75ce4/refugee-protectioninternational-law-scope-content-principle-non-refoulement.html (explaining that nonrefoulement is a concept which prohibits States from returning a refugee or asylum seeker
to territories in which there is a risk that his or her life or freedom would be threatened
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or
political opinion).
102. SUSAN MARK & ANDREW CLAPHAM, INT’L HUM. RTS. LEXICON 13 (2005).
103. Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty, supra note 5, at 15.
104. The suggestion of implementing a review of a signatory State’s arms transfers
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as a mechanism by which signatory States can avoid breaching the
threshold. In other words, the interim obligation only requires that
signatory States not transfer arms to countries that might use them to
commit violations of IHL. It does not require a formal review.
However, the suggestion that signatory States to the ATT undertake such
a review is a prudent way by which to ensure compliance with their
interim obligation.

IV.

SAUDI ARABIA CASE STUDY

On August 15, 2016, an airstrike by the Saudi-led coalition 105 targeted
a hospital operated by Doctors Without Borders (MSF) in northern
Yemen, killing at least fourteen people, including an MSF aid worker,
and injuring at least twenty-four others. 106 In the aftermath of the
airstrike, the fourth such attack against an MSF hospital in ten months,
the humanitarian group announced it would be ending its operations in
Yemen, driven in large part by the direct targeting of its hospitals. 107 This
reality was in stark contrast to the fact that the United States, that month,
was presented as a potentially helpful method by which to avoid actions that could
defeat the object and purpose of the ATT and is not to be confused with a positive
requirement on signatory States to implement Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT. Rather it
should be seen as a manifestation of the negative duty of the interim obligation of
signatory States.
105. For the purposes of this article, the reference to the Saudi-led coalition is meant
to reflect an assumption that the action was carried out by Saudi Arabia given the fact
that the coalition rarely attributes a specific air strike to one of its members. This
assumption is based on the reality that Saudi Arabia has the third largest F-15 fleet in
the world, the vast majority of air strikes are conducted by Saudi Arabia or the United
Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia is the leader of the coalition. See Declan Walsh & Eric
Schmitt, Arms Sales to Saudis Leave American Fingerprints on Yemen’s Carnage, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/25/world/middleeast/yemenus-saudi-civilianwar.html?em_pos=medium&emc=edit_war_20181227&nl=&nl_art=7&nlid=887820
93mc%3Dedit_
war_20181227&ref=headline&te=1; see also Gul Tuysuz & Steve Visser, Airstrike Hits
Yemen Hospital, Kills 14, Aid Group Says, CNN (Aug. 16, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/15/middleeast/yemen-hospital-strike/.
106. See Tuysuz & Visser, supra note 105.
107. See Rasha Mohamed & Rasha Abdul Rahim, Yemen’s Horror Exposes the Deadly
Hypocrisy of Arms Exporters Including Britain and the U.S., INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016),
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/yemens-horror-exposes-deadly-hypocrisy-arms-exportersincluding-britain-us-1578164.
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was attending the second Conference of States Parties to the ATT, a
treaty specifically meant to lessen human suffering and bring peace,
security, and stability. 108
The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 between the forces
loyal to President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi and the Houthi rebel
movement. 109 In January 2015, the Houthi forces captured Yemen’s
capital of Sana’a forcing President Hadi to flee to Saudi Arabia and to
invite foreign military intervention in an effort to prevent a complete
takeover by the Houthi rebels. 110 In response, Saudi Arabia formed a
coalition that has since been carrying out an extensive bombing campaign
that has caused a significant number of civilian casualties and has
correspondingly led to accusations that Saudi Arabia has committed war
crimes. 111 The U.N. Security Council in 2016 noted that “a particularly
worrisome escalation of [the Yemeni] conflict has been seen . . . [with] a
sixfold increase in the number of children killed and maimed.” 112 In a
statement to the U.N. Human Rights Council in 2017, Zeid Ra’ad Al
Hussein, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, stated that
“the leading cause of civilian casualties, including of children” were
airstrikes carried out by the Saudi-led coalition. 113 Of particular concern
108. Id.
109. See Yemen Crisis: Who is Fighting Whom?, BBC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2016),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423.
110. Id.; see Dealing in Double Standards: How Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia are Causing
Human
Suffering
in
Yemen,
ATT
MONITOR
2
(2016),
https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/webfm/Documents/issues/att_monitor_case_stu
dy_2_-_saudi_arabia__final_version.pdf?4MD5MH6FuNH8AYULhXQj5Xvw5mHijPQZ
[hereinafter
Dealing in Double Standards].
111. See Yemen: Saudi-Led Funeral Attack Apparent War Crime, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct.
13, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/13/yemen-saudi-led-funeral-attackapparent-war-crime.; see also Rasha Mohamed & Rawan Shaif, Saudi Arabia is Committing
War
Crimes
in
Yemen,
FOREIGN
POL’Y
(Mar.
25,
2016),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/25/civilian-casualties-war-crimes-saudi-arabiayemen-war/.
112. U.N. Secretary-General, Children and Armed Conflict, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/70/836—
S/2016/360 (Apr. 20, 2016).
113. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Darker and More
Dangerous: High Commissioner Updates the Human Rights Council on Human Rights
Issues in 40 Countries, Opening Statement to Human Rights Council 36th session
(Sept.
11,
2017),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2204
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has been the indiscriminate manner in which the Saudi-led coalition has
conducted airstrikes and how the coalition has failed to take all necessary
precautions to prevent civilian harm, which has lead to the targeting of
schools, hospitals, and religious gatherings. 114 These are all serious
violations of the IHL principles of distinction and proportionality. 115
Even though the bombing of the MSF hospital occurred on the same
day that other airstrikes targeted two schools in northern Yemen and
killed at least fourteen children, only the international humanitarian aid
organizations raised the alarm about the indiscriminate nature of the
airstrikes. 116 However, on October 8, 2016, that all changed with an
airstrike that targeted a funeral ceremony at a reception center in Sana’a
where the Houthi-allied interior minister was mourning his deceased
father. 117 The attack on the funeral was reported to have “killed at least
100 people and wounded more than 500, including children.” 118 In
addition to the first strike, it was reported that a second strike on the
same funeral ceremony hit “a few minutes [later] . . . affecting people
trying to enter the building to help survivors after the first bomb
detonated.” 119 This is a practice known as a ‘double-tap’ 120 and is a direct
violation of IHL. 121
1&LangID=E.
114. See U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Situation of Human Rights in Yemen,
Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, A/HRC/36/33, ¶ 28 (Sept. 13, 2017).
115. See id.
116. See Ghazi Balkiz et al., Saudi-Led Coalition Denies Targeting Yemini Schools that Killed
14
Children,
CNN
(Aug.
15,
2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/15/middleeast/yemen-schools-bombing/index.html.
117. See Mohammed Ghobari, Attack on Mourners in Yemen Kills More than 140, Say
Local Health Officials, REUTERS (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/usyemen-security-airstrike/attack-on-mourners-in-yemen-kills-more-than-140-say-localhealth-officials-idUSKCN1280OR; Shuaib Almosawa & Ben Hubbard, A Roar and a
Funeral, and Yemen’s War is Altered, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/10/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-arabiamilitary.html.
118. Yemen: Saudi-Led Funeral Attack Apparent War Crime, supra note 111.
119. Id.
120. Chris Woods & Mushtaq Yusufzai, Get the Data: The Return of Double-Tap Drone
Strikes, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Aug. 1, 2013),
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/08/01/get-the-data-the-return-ofdouble-tap-drone-strikes/.
121. See Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, art. 3 (1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Geneva Convention
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Notably, “[p]ictures taken from the ruined [reception center] building
showed that it had been hit with at least one US-manufactured airdropped FBUU-12 Paveway II 500-pound laser-guided bomb.” 122 This
proof that a U.S.-manufactured bomb was used in the airstrike on the
funeral tracks with other reports that American munitions have been
found in the wreckage of other airstrikes “including one with laserguidance equipment that was made in October 2015.” 123 Some of the
other American-made munitions that have been identified include “at
least one CBU-105, a cluster bomb[, found in the rubble of the Amran
Cement Factory that was] manufactured by Textron Defense Systems of
Rhode Island.” 124
In the days following the bombing of the funeral, the Saudi Joint
Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT) launched an investigation in
response to the resulting international criticism. 125
The JIAT
investigation found “that a party affiliated to the Yemeni Presidency of
the General Chief of Staff wrongly passed information that there was a
gathering of armed Houthi leaders in a known location in Sana’a, and
insisted that the location be targeted immediately as a legitimate military
(IV)] (“Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely,
without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or
wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain
prohibited at any time in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned
persons: (a) violence to the life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity,
in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without pervious judgment pronounced by a regularly
constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as
indispensable by civilized peoples.”).
122. Yemen: Saudi-Led Funeral Attack Apparent War Crime, supra note 111.
123. Ben Hubbard, U.S. Fingerprints on Attacks Obliterating Yemen’s Economy, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/14/world/middleeast/yemen-saudi-bombinghouthis-hunger.html; see also Yemen: U.S.-Made Bombs Used in Unlawful Airstrikes, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/12/08/yemen-usmade-bombs-used-unlawful-airstrikes.
124. Hubbard, supra note 123.
125. See Saudi Coalition Attacked Yemen Funeral Based on Wrong Information: Investigation,
REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudiidUSKBN12F090.
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target.” 126 Ultimately, the JIAT investigation determined that the Air
Operations Center in Yemen failed to obtain approval for the strike from
Coalition command and did not follow the Coalition command
precautionary measures “to ensure that the location [was] not a civilian
one.” 127 In a statement, JIAT said it would take “appropriate action, in
accordance with Coalition regulations . . . against those who caused the
incident, and that compensation must be offered to the families of
victims.” 128 The JIAT also provided assurances to the international
community that it would conduct a review of its targeting practices,
“rules of engagement (ROEs) and update their procedures to ensure
adherence in future.” 129
However, less than a month later, a Saudi-led coalition airstrike hit a
prison, killing at least sixty people. 130 According to reports, “[m]any of
those killed were inmates” 131 who “were serving jail terms for minor
crimes or who were in pre-trial detention.” 132 The Saudi-led coalition has
also destroyed “bridges, power stations, poultry farms, a key seaport and
factories that produce yogurt, tea, tissues, ceramics, Coca-Cola, and
potato chips” in what the United Nations has said is an “economic
dimension of this war . . . [and] a tactic . . . to put pressure on the
politics.” 133 The prisoners, like the funeral goers, civilian factories, and
infrastructure, all have protected status under IHL and cannot lawfully
be targeted during an armed conflict. 134
126. Press Release, Joint Incidents Assessment Team (JIAT), Great Hall Incident in
Sana’a,
(Oct.
15,
2016)
(on
file
with
Saudi
Press
Agency),
http://www.spa.gov.sa/viewstory.php?lang=en&newsid=1548647.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Sudarsan Raghavan, Airstrikes Kill More than 40 and Wound Scores in Yemeni
Port
City,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
31,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/airstrikes-kill-more-than-40-and-woundscores-in-yemeni-port-city/2016/10/30/4666dbfd-afa3-4f8f-95427ad77664d4ee_story.html?postshare=4471477934006192&tid=ss_tw.
131. Id.
132. Associated Press in Sana’a, Yemen: Death Toll from Saudi-Led Airstrike on Prisons
Rises
to
58,
THE
GUARDIAN
(Oct.
30,
2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/30/yemen-death-toll-from-saudiled-airstrike-on-prisons-rises-to-58.
133. Hubbard, supra note 123.
134. See Geneva Convention (IV) art. 3(1), supra note 121.
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This practice of targeting civilians and civilian objects by the Saudi-led
coalition has continued unabated, as a panel of experts reported to the
U.N Security Council in 2017, stating that “[i]n 8 of the 10 investigations,
the [p]anel found no evidence that the air strikes targeted legitimate
military objectives.” 135 The panel of experts went further by stating that
they could say with almost complete certainty that the Saudi-led
“coalition did not meet [IHL] requirements of proportionality and
precautions in attack . . . [and concluded that] some of the attacks may
amount to war crimes.” 136 In contrast, the JIAT in 2017 found their
targeting of “homes, schools and clinics” to be justified and that errors
in targeting only occurred three times in an investigation of fifteen
airstrikes. 137 By and large the JIAT said the Saudi-led coalition “acted in
accordance with [IHL] . . . absolv[ing] the coalition of responsibility for
attacks on a Coca-Cola factory . . . and a centre for the blind.” 138 On
August 9, 2018, the Saudi-led coalition carried out an airstrike on a school
bus in northern Yemen that killed fifty-four people, forty-four of them
children. 139 The reaction by the international community this time was
swift with the ICRC tweeting that “[u]nder international humanitarian
law, civilians must be protected during conflict.” 140 Despite the
international condemnation, Col. Turki al-Maliki, spokesman for the
Saud-led coalition, justified the airstrike “as a legitimate military
operation . . . carried out in accordance with international humanitarian
law,” because members of the Houthi rebels were in the bus. 141 In the
135. Panel of Experts on Yemen, Letter dated Jan. 27, 2017 from the Panel of
Experts on Yemen addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2018/193 ¶
127 (Jan. 31, 2017).
136. Id.
137. Stephen Kalin, Saudi Coalition Investigates Own Air Strikes, Clears Itself, REUTERS
(Sept.
12,
2017),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-securityinvestigation/saudi-coalition-investigates-own-air-strikes-clears-itselfidUSKCN1BN2O6.
138. Id.
139. See Shuaib Almosawa et al., 44 Small Graves Stir Questions About U.S. Policy in
Yemen,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/world/middleeast/saudi-yemen-bomb-buschildren.html.
140. ICRC Yemen (@ICRC_ye), TWITTER (Aug. 9, 2018, 12:38 AM),
https://twitter.com/icrc_ye/status/1027459027540893696?lang=en.
141. Stephen Snyder, Civilians Say ‘Time to Say No for War’ After Dozens of Yemeni
Children
Die
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School
Bus
Attack,
PRI
(Aug.
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2018),
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days following, munitions experts confirmed that the bomb used “was a
500-pound (227-kilogram) laser-guided MK 82 bomb made by Lockheed
Martin,” similar to the munitions used in the attack on the funeral in
2016. 142 Additionally, it has been confirmed that U.S.-supplied
munitions and weapons have been used by the Saudi-led coalition in
attacks on hospitals, markets, homes, weddings, funerals, civilian
infrastructure, and other civilian objects. 143
While the United States does not conduct or assist in the targeting
assessments for the Saudi-led coalition, “[h]undreds of American
aviation mechanics and other specialists, working under Defense
Department contracts, keep the Saudi F-15 fleet in the air.” 144 This fleet
is now the “world’s third-largest fleet of F-15 jets, after the United States
and Israel,” thanks to multi-billion dollar arms sales of aircraft and airto-ground munitions from the United States to Saudi Arabia facilitated
by the U.S. Department of Defense. 145
https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-08-11/civilians-say-time-say-no-war-after-dozensyemeni-children-die-school-bus-attack; see generally Stephen Kalin & Ahmed Tolba,
Saudi-led coalition admits deadly Yemen strike on bus was unjustified, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-saudi-strike/saudi-led-coalitionadmits-deadly-yemen-strike-on-bus-was-unjustified-idUSKCN1LH3JO?il=0
(reporting that while a subsequent JIAT investigation of the airstrike found that the
bombing was “unjustified and pledged to hold accountable anyone who contributed to
the error,” such a investigation and finding is rare and likely occurred because of
international pressure).
142. Nima Elbagir et al., Bomb that Killed 40 Children in Yemen was Supplied by the U.S.,
CNN (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/17/middleeast/us-saudiyemen-bus-strike-intl/index.html.
143. See HUM. RTS. WATCH, HIDING BEHIND THE COALITION: FAILURE TO
CREDIBLY INVESTIGATE AND PROVIDE REDRESS FOR UNLAWFUL ATTACKS IN YEMEN
(2018).
144. Walsh & Schmitt, supra note 105.
145. Id.; see William D. Hartung & Derek Paulhus, Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: The
Corporate
Connection,
CTR.
FOR
INT’L
POL’Y
(Aug.
10,
2017),
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/488e54_c56ac4bc8f3443f8941e994f629af385.pdf. See
generally Jeffrey E. Stern, From Arizona to Yemen: The Journey of an American Bomb, N.Y.
TIMES MAG. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/11/magazine/waryemen-american-bombstrike.html?emc=edit_ck_20181214&nl=cooking&nlid=5133973520181214&te=;
Aaron Mehta, Revealed: Trump’s $110 Billion Weapons List for the Saudis, DEFENSE NEWS
(June 8, 2017), https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/06/08/revealedtrump-s-110-billion-weapons-list-for-the-saudis/.
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A. THE U.S. RESPONSE
From the beginning of the conflict in Yemen, the United States has
opposed the Houthi rebels and sought to support President Hadi. 146
When the Saudi-led coalition entered the Yemeni conflict in 2015, the
United States began providing logistical support in the form of aerial
refueling and limited intelligence support, though not with regard to
specific targeting. 147 As the intensity of the conflict increased, so did the
logistical support by the United States, such that by August 8, 2016, the
U.S. Air Force “sorties in support of the Saudi-led coalition against
Yemeni rebels [had] increased roughly 61 percent since AFCENT last
provided data in February.” 148 In short, “[m]any of the [Saudi-led
coalition] strikes are carried out by pilots trained by the United States,
who fly American-made jets that are refueled in the air by American
planes.” 149 Beyond logistical support, the United States also continued
to seek approval for weapons sales and arms transfers to Saudi Arabia
with the express knowledge that those defense articles would be
“replenishing Saudi weaponry damaged or used up in Yemen.” 150
Despite a brief ban on the sale of precision-guided munitions
following the funeral hall attack, the provision of “defense articles and
services, including air-to-air refueling; certain intelligence support; and
military advice” continued unabated. 151 On March 22, 2018, the U.S.
146. See Bruce Riedel, A Brief History of America’s Troubled Relationship with Yemen,
BROOKINGS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/10/22/a-brief-history-of-americas-troubled-relationship-with-yemen/.
147. See Andrew Tilghman, U.S. Launches Aerial Refueling Mission in Yemen, MILITARY
TIMES
(Apr.
8,
2015),
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/04/08/refuelingmission/25461213/.
148. Oriana Pawlyk, U.S. Air Force Refueling Missions over Yemen Grow by 60 Percent,
AIRFORCE
TIMES
(Aug.
8,
2016),
https://www.airforcetimes.com/story/military/2016/08/08/us-air-force-refuelingmissions-over-yemen-grow-60-percent/88400838/.
149. Hubbard, supra note 123.
150. William D. Hartung, U.S. Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia and the War in Yemen,
SECURITY
ASSISTANCE
MONITOR
(Sept.
7,
2016),
http://securityassistance.org/fact_sheet/us-arms-transfers-saudi-arabia-and-waryemen#_edn1.
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State Department approved a new arms sale to Saudi Arabia totaling
nearly $1 billion that included “6,500 anti-tank missiles, as well as services
and parts for Abram tanks, armored vehicles, helicopters, and other
military equipment.” 152 Less than a month after the approval of that sale,
the U.S. State Department approved another arms sale to Saudi Arabia
for $1.3 billion, including “180 155 mm M109A5/A6 medium selfpropelled howitzer structures for conversion to 177 155 mm M109A6
Paladin medium self-propelled howitzer systems . . . [to] enhance Saudi
Arabia’s ability to support its deployed forces [in Yemen] and defend its
borders.” 153 These sales were approved even in the face of reports that
the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes were continuing to target civilians and
civilian objects. 154
While the U.S. Senate has sought on two separate occasions to stop
the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia through bipartisan resolutions, citing
the high number of civilian casualties and seeming disregard for the IHL
principles of proportionality and distinction, neither attempt garnered
enough support to prevent the sales. 155 Officials at the U.S. State
Department who reviewed the pending arms sales shared the concerns
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4390794/Acting-GC-Letter-toMajority-Leader-Re-Sanders.pdf.
152. Abramson, supra note 27.
153. Kheel, supra note 27.
154. See Saudi Coalition Airstrikes Target Civilian Factories in Yemen: Unlawful Attacks
Harm Economy, Show Need for Victim Compensation, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 11, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/11/saudi-coalition-airstrikes-target-civilianfactories-yemen (reporting that Saudi-led coalition strikes have hit numerous factories,
warehouses, and other civilian structures in Yemen killing 130 civilians and injuring 171
more); Yemen: U.S. Bombs Used in Deadliest Market Strike: Coalition Allies Should Stop Selling
Weapons to Saudi Arabia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 7, 2016),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/04/07/yemen-us-bombs-used-deadliest-marketstrike (stating that Saudi-led coalition strikes using U.S.-supplied bombs hit a market
killing 97 civilians, including 25 children).
155. See Jeremy Herb & Seung Min Kim, Senate Backs Tank Sales to Saudi Arabia,
POLITICO (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/09/senate-saudiarabia-tank-sales-228479; Elana Schor, Senate Backs Weapons Sales to Saudi Arabia,
POLITICO (June 13, 2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/06/13/saudiarabia-weapons-sales-senate-approves-239505; Letter from Ted W. Lieu (D-CA 33rd
District) to Glenn A. Fine Acting Inspector General for the Department of Defense
(Aug.
13,
2018),
https://lieu.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/files/2018-0813%20TWL%20Letter%20to%20DoD%20IG%20Fine%20-%20Yemen.pdf
(asserting that these disproportionate airstrikes violate international law).
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of the U.S. Senate and were on record as being “skeptical of the Saudi
military’s ability to target Houthi militants without killing civilians.” 156
Notably, “a State Department specialist on protecting civilians in conflict
acknowledged Saudi strikes were going awry . . . [and that] State
Department lawyers ‘had their hair on fire’ as reports of civilians
casualties in Yemen multiplied.” 157 Behind the scenes, the United States
emphasized to Saudi officials the need to use “the utmost diligence in the
targeting process and to take all precautions to minimize civilian
casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure.” 158
Yet publicly, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that the
United States has “not seen any callous disregard . . . [and t]he training
that we have given [Saudi Arabia], we know has paid off,” even as reports
circulated of Saudi-led airstrikes bombing a market and a school bus of
children. 159 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Defense has opted to attach
training programs for the Saudi military forces on “civilian casualty
avoidance, the law of armed conflict, human rights command and
control” as a part of recent arms sales in an attempt to limit the instances
of civilian casualties. 160 Contrary, however, to the assertion that such
trainings have “paid off,” a former Assistant Secretary of State opined
that the “American efforts to advise the Saudis on how to protect
civilians often came to naught” as the Saudis “were just not willing to
listen” and continued to strike targets the United States had identified as
civilian. 161 At the same time, the U.S. Department of Defense defended
the actions of the Saudi-led coalition even as evidence continued to
mount that U.S.-supplied bombs were and continued to be used by the
Saudi-led coalition in various airstrikes targeting civilians and civilian
156. Warren Strobel & Jonathan Landy, Exclusive – As Saudis Bombed Yemen, U.S.
Worried
About
Legal
Blowback,
REUTERS
(Oct.
10,
2016),
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-usa-saudi-yemen-exclusive-idUKKCN12A0BG.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Luis Martinez, Mattis: U.S. Support to Saudi Coalition in Yemen Not Unconditional,
ABC NEWS (Aug. 28, 2018), https://abcnews.go.com/International/mattis-ussupport-saudi-coalition-yemen-unconditional/story?id=57459659; see Elbagir et al.,
supra note 142.
160. News Release, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Dep’t of Defense
(June 5, 2017), https://www.dsca.mil/sites/default/files/mas/saudi_arabia_16-77.pdf.
161. Walsh & Schmitt, supra note 105.
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objects. 162 The response by the U.S. Department of Defense to such
evidence was to declare that the United States “may never know if the
munitions [used] was one that the US sold to [Saudi Arabia],” stating
further that the United States would not investigate such airstrikes
because “the Pentagon doesn’t ‘provide or vet the Saudi-led coalition
targets.’” 163
However, the reality seems to belie the suggestion that it was not
possible for the United States to know whether the munitions used to
target civilians and civilian objects were American-made. 164 As noted by
the U.S. State Department’s former adviser on civilian harm, who
worked with the Saudi-led coalition from 2015 to 2017, information
detailing “every airstrike: warplane, target, munitions used and a brief
description of the attack,” including whether the munitions used were
U.S.-made, is maintained in a database that the American liaison officer
in Riyadh had access to and from which spreadsheets of that data were
often shared internally. 165 The existence of such a database was not
disputed by U.S. Central Command which stated that “American officers
only used coalition data to carry out their core mission: advising on
civilian casualties, sharing intelligence on Houthi threats.” 166 Even
without access to the military database, investigative reporting by news
agencies and human rights organizations has been able to identify
numerous instances where U.S.-made bombs were used in strikes on
civilians and civilian objects since 2015. 167
As reports of civilian casualties mounted, the U.S. Congress, although
unable to prevent further arms sales, sought to make U.S. military
support (i.e. refueling, intelligence, and military advice) conditional on
certification by the Secretary of State that Saudi Arabia was
“undertaking . . . demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to
162. HUM. RTS. WATCH, supra note 143.
163. Alex Ward, The Pentagon Won’t Check if U.S. Bombs Killed Kids in Yemen. CNN Did
it
for
Them,
VOX
(Aug.
20,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/20/17760322/yemen-children-bomb-bus-pentagon.
164. Stern, supra note 145.
165. Walsh & Schmitt, supra note 105.
166. Id.
167. See generally Nima Elbagir et al., Exclusive Report: Made in America, CNN (Sept.
2018), https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2018/09/world/yemen-airstrikes-intl/.
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civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations.” 168
On September 10, 2018, despite the multiplying reports of indiscriminate
airstrikes and internal U.S. government frustration over the level of
civilian harm, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo provided the required
certification, an action that was quickly endorsed by then-Secretary of
Defense James Mattis. 169 While the failure to certify would not have
prevented the continued sale of arms to Saudi Arabia, the certification
shows that U.S. agencies were unwilling to jeopardize a close, financially
significant, relationship with Saudi Arabia over verifiable violations of
IHL and potential war crimes. 170
The compelling financial incentives of the relationship are
demonstrated by the fact that when Saudi Arabia seeks to purchase arms
and munitions from the United States, it prefers to use the U.S.
Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales program (FMS) instead
of purchasing directly from the manufacturers. 171 As part of the FMS,
the “Pentagon handles the logistics and liaises with the private companies
to fulfill the” FMS order, 172 while the U.S. State Department reviews and
approves all FMS purchase orders and ensures the sales are in
compliance with FMS’ objective of “strengthen[ing] the security of the
U.S. and promot[ing] world peace.” 173 In exchange for its services, the
U.S. Department of Defense charges the purchasing country a two

168. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub.
L. No. 115-232, § 1290 (c)(1)(C)(2018).
169. Press Statement, Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, Certification to Congress
on Actions of Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen Under the NDAA (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/09/285861.htm; News Release,
Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, Statement by Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis on
Actions of Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/1628689/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-james-n-mattis-on-actionsof-saudi-arabia-and/source/GovDelivery/#.W5kkKhz8q11.twitter.
170. See Dion Nissenbaum, Top U.S. Diplomat Backed Continuing Support for Saudi War
in Yemen Over Objections of Staff, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 20, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-u-s-diplomat-backed-continuing-support-forsaudi-war-in-yemen-over-objections-of-staff-1537441200.
171. Stern, supra note 145.
172. Id.
173. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign
Military Sales,
https://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-sales-fms (last visited Sept. 3, 2019).
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percent administrative fee on the overall purchase price. 174 With $15.9
billion worth of conventional weapons, equipment, and training
delivered to Saudi Arabia as part of the FMS program since the start of
the Yemeni conflict, there is little doubt that the United States had a
vested financial interest in continuing to conclude arms sales with Saudi
Arabia. 175

B. IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARMS SALES
The ultimate decision by the United States to approve arms sales to
Saudi Arabia squarely marks those arms transfers as affirmative acts that
reached the threshold for defeating the object and purpose of the ATT.
While a signatory to the ATT, the United States had a duty to refrain
from approving arms transfers that knowingly undermined
“international and regional peace, security and stability” and that lead to
“human suffering” through the undermining of “[r]espect[ . . . ] and
ensuring respect for international humanitarian law.” 176 Considering that
the United States was the single largest exporter of military equipment to
Saudi Arabia from 2014 to 2018, 177 that there are multitudes of reports
of indiscriminate attacks on civilians by the Saudi-led coalition in
Yemen, 178 that reports have confirmed that bombs manufactured by the
174. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, DSCA to Reduce FMS Administrative
Surcharge for Partners, https://www.dsca.mil/news-media/news-archive/dsca-reducefms-administrative-surcharge-partners.
175. See Sec. Assistance Monitor, supra note 18.
176. ATT art. 1, supra note 19.
177. See TIV of Arms Exports to Saudi Arabia 2014–2018, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE
RES. INST., https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php (last visited Oct. 7,
2019) (showing data that the United States is the largest exporter of arms to Saudi
Arabia, with a SIPRI TIV value of 11,470 of the total 16,869); Sources and Methods,
STOCKHOLM
INT’L
PEACE
RES.
INST.,
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods/ (last visited
Oct.14, 2019) (“SIPRI TIV figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers. They
should therefore not be directly compared with gross domestic product (GDP), military
expenditure, sales values or the financial value of export licenses in an attempt to
measure the economic burden of arms imports or the economic benefits of exports.
They are best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers
over periods of time, global percentages for suppliers and recipients, and percentages
for the volume of transfers to or from particular states.”).
178. See generally “What Military Target Was in My Brother’s House?” Unlawful Coalition
Airstrikes
in
Yemen,
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RTS.
WATCH
(2015),
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United States were being used by the Saudi-led coalition to attack civilian
targets, 179 and that it is common knowledge within the U.S. State
Department that the Saudi military was not sufficiently capable of
distinguishing military targets in an urban environment, 180 there is little
question that U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia from 2014 through 2019
defeated the object and purpose of the ATT.
It bears mentioning that the United States has a policy in place that
requires a review of all arms transfers. 181 Initially implemented via a
classified directive in 1995, the U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
was updated and made public on January 15, 2014 as Presidential Policy
Directive 27 (PPD-27). PPD-27’s stated purpose was to support arms
“transfers that meet [the] legitimate security requirements of [U.S.] allies
and partners in support of [U.S.] national security and foreign policy
interests.” 182 As part of accomplishing this stated purpose, “[a]ll arms
transfer decisions will be guided by a set of criteria that maintains the
appropriate balance between legitimate arms transfers to support U.S.
national security . . . and the need for restraint against the transfer of
arms that would . . . serve to facilitate human rights abuses or violations
of international humanitarian law, or otherwise undermine international
security.” 183 Based on the language of PPD-27, and given that the
directive was put in force soon after signature of the ATT, it would seem
that the United States sought to establish a review mechanism—similar
to the one previously mentioned 184—that could potentially ensure that
U.S. arms transfers did not reach the threshold for defeating the object
and purpose of the ATT. Even with this review mechanism, however,
arms transfers to Saudi Arabia continued unabated, demonstrating the
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/yemen1115_4up.pdf.
179. See Strobel & Landy, supra note 156.
180. Id.
181. See Gregory M. Kauser, Deputy Sec’y, Bureau of Pol.-Mil. Aff., Remarks to IISS:
Conventional Arms Transfer Policy: Advancing American National Security Through Security
Cooperation
(Apr.
23,
2014),
https://20092017.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/2014/225118.htm.
182. Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-27, United States Conventional Arms
Transfer Policy (Jan. 15, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/15/presidential-policy-directive-united-states-conventional-armstransfer-p.
183. Id. (emphasis added).
184. See supra Part III.C.
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failure of the policy and corresponding oversight mechanism to fulfill the
U.S.’ interim obligation as a signatory to the ATT.
On April 19, 2018, PPD-27 was replaced by a National Security
Presidential Memorandum (NSPM) with the stated purpose of “better
aligning [U.S.] policy regarding conventional arms transfers with [U.S.]
national and economic security interests.” 185 The NSPM makes an
unequivocal shift to considering the financial benefit as a major factor in
approval of arms transfers by stating that the new policy changes will
“bolster [the U.S.] economy; spur research and development; enhance
the ability of the [U.S.] defense industrial base to create jobs; [and]
increase [U.S.] competitiveness in key markets.” 186 While the NSPM
maintains the requirement from PPD-27 that the United States consider
whether an arms transfer “may be used to undermine international peace
and security or contribute to abuses of human rights . . . [or] violations
of international humanitarian law” and even to cancel the transfer
authorization if it is known at the time “that the transferred arms will be
used to commit: genocide; crimes against humanity; grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949,” there is little doubt that the financial
incentives have become the driving force behind approval of arms
transfers. 187 The view of arms transfers in purely economic terms is best
illustrated by the statement in the NSPM that the U.S. government will
actively seek to “increase trade opportunities for United States [defense]
companies . . . [through] advocacy and trade promotion.” 188
While the United States does, therefore, have a policy by which to
ensure that its arms transfers are “consistent with the requirements of all
[domestic laws] and international commitments and obligations,” the fact
that transfers to Saudi Arabia occurred is sufficient to constitute an
action that defeated the object and purpose of the ATT because of the
documented disregard for IHL as evidenced by the high level of civilian

185. Presidential Memoranda, National Security Presidential Memorandum
Regarding U.S. Conventional Arms Transfer Policy (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/national-security-presidentialmemorandum-regarding-u-s-conventional-arms-transfer-policy.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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harm. 189 The existence of a review mechanism cannot negate the liability
of a State that violates the interim obligation. While a signatory to the
ATT, the United States maintained a continuing negative duty to refrain
from the transfer of arms to a country that has allegedly committed war
crimes. 190

V. CONCLUSION
The interim obligation of signatory States to any treaty is to avoid
taking action that seeks to defeat the treaty’s object and purpose. How
to identify the object and purpose of a treaty has been and will likely
continue to be a topic of vigorous debate. In the case of the ATT,
however, Article 1 and the Preamble establish in clear terms its object
and purpose. Signatories to the ATT shall refrain from actions that
undermine international and regional peace, security, and stability and
that increase human suffering through violations of IHL. As such, the
U.S.’ decision to repeatedly follow through with the sale of arms to Saudi
Arabia from 2014 through 2019 was clearly a violation of its interim
obligation as a signatory to the ATT.
The reality that the United States violated its interim obligation as a
signatory to the ATT should be seen as a wake-up call for arms exporting
countries that have signed the treaty. While the U.S. share of the global
arms market made it particularly vulnerable to taking actions that
potentially reached the threshold for defeating the object and purpose of
the ATT, there is no minimum quantity necessary to trigger a violation
of a signatory’s interim obligation. The only requirement for determining
whether the arms sale triggers a violation is whether it would undermine
international and regional peace, security, and stability while also causing
human suffering through violations of IHL. Fundamentally, signatories
to the ATT should include in their conventional arms transfer policy an
explicit assessment of whether a transfer would defeat the object and
purpose of the ATT—being particularly mindful of arms transfers to
countries involved in an armed conflict.
Regardless of future actions taken to ensure compliance, it remains up
to the State Parties to the ATT to enforce some admonishment or
189. Id.
190. Dealing in Double Standards, supra note 110, at 5–7.
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punishment on the United States for its violations of the interim
obligation from 2014 to 2019. Without consequences—political,
economic, or diplomatic—there is little practical use in having an
identifiable object and purpose, even when that object and purpose is to
reduce human suffering.
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